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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information in credit markets generates an adverse selection equilibrium, if the
Walrasian loan price based on the average risk of the borrowers is too high to induce the par-
ticipation of low risk customers.1 The equilibrium is ineﬃcient, as it increases the credit risk
in banks’ portfolio and high interest rates ration economically viable projects from credit. To
mitigate adverse selection lenders can employ screening instruments, such as collateral, which
might induce separating equilibrium in the market.2 These lending practices are, however, so-
cially wasteful, because collateral is more valuable to the borrower than to the lender. Besanko
and Thakor (1987) show that the use of collateral as a sorting instrument depends on the par-
ticularities of the markets studied. Under perfect competition collateral is a meaningful sorting
device, but optimal credit policy under monopolistic competition involves zero collateral, as
the bank rather sorts the borrowers using price rationing. Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr
(1999) investigate oligopolist credit markets and derive a similar result where higher degree
of competition mitigates adverse selection through increased screening. Although increased
screening mitigates adverse selection, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr argue that the social
cost of posting collateral implies lower welfare than in the case of less competitive markets.
The objective of this paper is to further examine the adverse selection problem in imper-
fectly competitive credit markets where borrowers have no collaterizable wealth outside the
borrowing firms’ assets. This situation is especially relevant when borrowers apply for loans
for launching new businesses. Contrary to the existing papers on adverse selection in the credit
market under imperfect competition, we show that a separating outcome may arise from the
underlying structure of the credit market where the borrowers have an initial preference to one
bank over the other. This implies that separating equilibrium can be implemented without
collateral or price rationing. The result, however, requires that the intensity of competition in
the credit market is neither very high nor too low, because the supply of credit is maximized
at some intermediate level of bank competition.
The idea that neither perfect nor very modest competition in the credit market is conducive
to high supply of credit is in line with market evidence. For instance, Bonaccorsi di Patti
and Dell’Ariccia (2004) find a ’bell-shaped’ relationship between bank competition and firm
1See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which draws on the ’lemons market outcome’ derived by Akerlof (1970).
Other early models on adverse selection and credit rationing include Jaﬀee and Russel (1976) and Keeton
(1979). For a review, see Clemenz and Ritthaler (1992)
2Bester (1985, 1987) characterizes how banks can implement a perfectly sorting competitive equilibrium by
oﬀering menus of loan contracts with diﬀerent combinations of interest rate and collateral requirement.
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creation. Since the availability of credit is a necessary precondition to launching new economic
activities, where collateral constraints often bind, the result resembles the one derived in this
paper. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia also report that the pattern is pronounced in
informational opaque industries; i.e. in sectors where the adverse selection problem is the
most likely to arise. One possible interpretation of our analysis is that the adverse selection
problem can severely limit the feasibility of ’transaction based’ lending under very competitive
or highly monopolized market conditions. Our results may therefore help understand recent
evidence (e.g. Elsas, 2005) that ’relationship based’ lending tends to be most widely used
when the competition in the credit market is either very intense or rather low.
We consider a credit market involving an imperfectly competitive banking sector and cus-
tomers who prefer one bank over the other, so that for conducting business with the less
preferred bank induces a disutility for the borrower.3 We prove the existence of a separat-
ing equilibrium where the preferred bank serves only the high risk customers while the low
risk borrowers receive finance from the ex-ante non-preferred bank.4 The intuition why the
separating equilibrium is feasible resembles the reason why diﬀerent collateral requirements
can induce separation. Since borrowers are protected by limited liability, the ’high risk -
high yield’ customers rather accept higher interest rates from the preferred bank than pay
the cost for visiting the less preferred one.5 The ’low risk - low yield’ borrowers, in turn, are
more sensitive to interest rates and therefore more likely accept an oﬀer with lower interest
rates. Consequently, the non-preferred bank can capture the low risk customers, insofar as
it can feasibly internalize the cost the borrowers incur. Compared with the perfect competi-
tion benchmark, imperfect competition improves market eﬃciency as it prevents the low risk
customers from being rationed.
As is usual in spatial models of imperfect competition, the cost of visiting banks can be
used as proxy for the degree of competition in the credit market. This indicates that the
banks should have a certain degree of market power to ensure that the separating equilibrium
exists. To show this, we derive a threshold for the degree of competition where the sepa-
3The interpretation of the cost reflects a wide array of dimensions, ranging from geographical preferences
to suitability of available accounts and other financial services. Alternatively, each location can be thought as
a submarket where one bank holds a position as a preferred supplier of finance.
4Ex-ante non-preferred bank refers to a bank the borrower would not choose, if she received an identical
quote from another bank.
5Even though the pecuniary magnitude of the ’travel cost’ of visiting the less-preferred bank may not be
comparable to collateral requirements, Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) assert that costs of this kind, e.g. switching
costs, can be substantial and they significantly reduce the contestability of the banking sector.
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rating equilibrium becomes feasible. Beyond this limit the availability of credit to the low
risk customers gradually increases as the intensity of competition decreases. The separating
outcome is thus feasible in the market segments where the cost of visiting the non-preferred
bank is suﬃciently large, so that only low risk borrowers have an incentive to accept the quote
with a lower rate. This outcome holds insofar as the banks can reduce the interest rates to
compensate the low risk borrowers for the loss they incur applying loans from the initially less
preferred bank. Hence, as the monopoly power of the banks increases above a certain level,
the relative share of the separating market segments decreases. The relationship between
competition and borrower separation indicates that there is a unique level of competition for
which the overall availability of credit is at the highest. This also turns out to be the welfare
maximizing market structure.
The results derived in this paper resemble both Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Villas-
Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) where screening is more valuable in a competitive market
environment and less meaningful in imperfectly competitive markets. However, the existence
of a separating equilibrium without explicit screening activities is obviously a qualification
to the existing results. Our model can also be used to assess banks’ risk taking behavior
under diﬀerent competitive environments. The property that there is a welfare maximizing
market structure which minimizes credit rationing in the market also minimizes the average
default risk in the banks’ portfolio; i.e. the degree of competition and risk taking are non-
monotonously related. The result thus contradicts the usual argument that banks tend to
choose riskier portfolio strategies when the competition increases (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Besanko
and Thakor 1987, 1993; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993; Edwards and Mishkin, 1995).6 In the
customer screening literature Broecker (1990), Nakamura (1993) and Riordan (1993) iden-
tify winner’s curse type distortions of competition. The broad idea is that when the banks’
screening technologies are imperfectly correlated, the likelihood of a poor loan applicant get-
ting finance increases as the number of banks operating in the market is higher induces too
much finance as opposed to credit rationing7. Finally, our study relates to the literature on
6Carletti and Hartmann (2003) survey the literature and conclude that the relationship between competition
and risk taking is not necessarily robust. In the moral hazard literature,for instance, there are models showing
that also the reverse can be true. Caminal and Matutes (2002) show that a monopoly bank might grant larger
loans than competitive banks, which leads to a riskier portfolio, if the risks are non-diversifiable.
7A similar overlending result is obtained by DeMeza and Webb (1987) in a variant of the competitive adverse
selection model where high risk borrowers are poorer customers also in a sense that they have lower expected
returns.
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customer poaching (e.g. Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000).8 The conventional poach-
ing story is that firms may oﬀer discounts to their competitor’s customers if this ’stolen’
business can in later periods be secured by establishing switching cost barriers. In our model
poaching emerges as an equilibrium strategy in situations where the banks fail to sort borrow-
ers in their captive market segments, but the borrowers’ heterogeneous preferences toward the
banks allow the banks to ’cherry-pick’ the low risk customers from the rival’s captive markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic setup of the
model. The credit market equilibria are derived in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the relation-
ship between the bank competition and the availability of credit. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a credit market with two banks A and B. The borrowers are endowed with a tech-
nology which combined with capital yields a stochastic income. Banks oﬀer standard debt
contracts to borrowers. The amount of capital required to start a project is normalized to
unity and the borrowers’ debt service obligation to bank I is denoted by RI (I = A,B). There
is a perfectly elastic supply of funds where the banks can borrow at rate R¯.
It is common knowledge that a fraction λ of the borrowers’ projects have a low success
probability pL. The complementary fraction 1−λ are borrowers with high success probability
pH . The value of the output generated by an L-type borrower is qL. The value of a project
with higher success probability (H −type) is qH . If the project fails, it produces nothing
regardless of the type of the borrower. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)9 we assume that
the expected values of the outputs are such that
QL = pLqL = QH = pHqH ≡ Q, (2.1)
indicating that the H-type is better than the L-type according to the second-order stochastic
dominance. Moreover, we assume that Q > R¯ , so that the projects obtain positive ’social’
NPV.
8Bouckaert and Degryse (2006) analyze poaching and entry in credit markets where incumbent banks have
an information advantage over the entrants. In their model poaching occurs if the adverse selection problem
is not too harsh or the incumbent bank shares information with the entrant.
9Our justification for relating the Stiglitz-Weiss assumption to debt financing is that our purpose is not to
discuss optimal contracts (cf. De Meza and Webb, 1987) but to elaborate the consequences of the classical
adverse selection problem, given that the form of the financial contract is standard debt, which is in practice
commonly used in any bank lending business.
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Since the banks cannot learn the types of the borrowers ex-ante, these assumptions readily
imply that in a pooling equilibrium where both types of borrowers apply for loans, the break
even rate for the banks is
Rˆ =
R¯
λpL + (1− λ) pH
.
This condition implies that the credit market is subject to an adverse selection problem when
Rˆ > qH , because there is no feasible loan rate such that both the bank would break even and
each borrower would accept the same loan contract. The credit market thus exists only for
L—types if the interest rate R satisfies qL ≥ R ≥ Rˆ. This outcome is ineﬃcient in a sense that
some potentially gainful trade fails to occur.
Following the spatial competition models, first introduced by Hotelling (1929), we assume
that the banks operate in a market with a continuum of borrowers distributed uniformly on
a line with length l. The banks are spatially diﬀerentiated so that they are located at the
two opposite ends of the line - bank A at location 0 and bank B at location l. The borrowers
are randomly distributed over the line so that each location is occupied by an L-type with
probability λ.
The borrowers have a subjective preference toward accepting an oﬀer from either bank A
or bank B. Customers closer to location 0 prefer bank A while customers closer l prefer bank
B. Customers located in l/2 are indiﬀerent between the two banks. Visiting a non-preferred
bank a borrower incurs a cost which equals the customers’ distance from the centre measured
by the index x. To economize in notation, we assume that the cost the borrowers incur for
borrowing from the less preferred bank is linear and increasing with unit slope in distance
between the center of the line and the borrower. Thus, x represents the location of a particular
customer and the cost of visiting the banks. The preferred bank can always be approached
without any costs. The assumption Q > R¯ guarantees that trade is feasible between any loan
applicant and the ex ante preferred bank. The customers in bank A’s (B’s) ’captive’ market
segment thus face a cost xA ∈ [0, l/2] (xB ∈ [0, l/2]), should they accept the oﬀer quoted by
the non-preferred bank.
In what follows we use the parameter l as a proxy for the degree of competition in the
market. Since this is the distance between the banks, it can be linked to more traditional
models of spatial competition, such as Salop (1979), where the distance between the sellers
decreases as the number of active firms increases. The assumption that the borrowers incur
a cost visiting only the more distant bank is obviously a simplification. We, however, note
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that the qualitative results of the paper can be derived in a conventional spatial models such
as Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979).10 Figure 1 illustrates the spatial setup of the model.
Bank A Bank B
l/2                   xA 0
Figure 1
We assume the banks can observe borrowers’ exact locations. Our justification for this
assumption is that the banks can usually gather some information, for instance, about the
clients’ demand for diﬀerent financial services. If we adopt the geographical interpretation
of the spatial model, it is obvious that geographical locations of borrowers can easily be
assessed on behalf of the banks. As the loan contract oﬀers are typically delivered to each loan
applicant separately, these assumptions imply that the banks can eﬀectively price discriminate
the borrowers across locations.
3 Equilibrium in Credit markets
This section characterizes the equilibrium in the credit markets. The analysis proceeds in three
steps. At first, we derive the market segments where separating outcome can be supported
as an equilibrium. Second, we derive the adverse selection outcomes in locations where only
the L-type borrowers will be financed. Finally, we illustrate how the competitiveness of the
credit market aﬀects the availability of finance for the H-type borrowers.
3.1 Separating equilibrium
We proceed under the conjecture that separation is feasible only if xi ∈ [xi, xi], and then show
that this conjecture is fulfilled in equilibrium. A separating equilibrium within these locations
is such that the preferred bank oﬀers loan contracts only acceptable to the L-types in this
market segment while the non-preferred bank is able to serve the H-type borrowers.
Consider bank A as the preferred bank. When oﬀering loan contracts to borrowers in
locations xA ∈ [xA, xA], bank A’s optimization program is
10This would, however, increase the notation and conditions ensuring the existence of the relevant equilibria
without adding any insight to the main results.
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max
RA
pLRA − R¯
s.t. RA ≥
R¯
pL
(PCA)
pL (qL −RA) ≥ 0 (IRL)
pL (qL −RA) ≥ pL (qL −RB)− xA, (ICL)
where xA is the cost the borrower located at xA incurs for visiting Bank B. The existence
of a separating equilibrium requires that although H-type borrower must pay the cost, she
rather accepts the oﬀer from bank B. The problem of bank B is therefore the following
max
RB
pHRB − R¯
s.t. RB ≥
R¯
pH
(PCB)
pH (qH −RB)− xA ≥ 0 (IRH)
pH (qH −RB)− xA ≥ pH (qH −RA) . (ICH)
We solve for the interest rates supporting the proposed separating equilibrium by using
the above IC and IR constraints. These constraints involve the following properties, which
are important for the derivation of the results below. First, the banks objectives are linear
and increasing functions of the charged loan rate. The optimum is therefore a corner solution
implying that the quotes RA and RB are the maximum rates which satisfy the constraints.
On the borrowers side of the market, the IR constraints exhibit the property that the L-type
borrowers put less weight on the interest rate, because they are less concerned about their
debt-service obligation than the H-type borrowers with higher success probability. Since the
preferences toward the banks are the same for both types, this property implies that H-type
borrowers are more likely to accept bank B’s oﬀer than the L-type.
Consider first the borrowers’ incentive constraints. The RHS of ICL is strictly larger than
the LHS of IRH indicating that ICL is binding while IRL is slack. We can therefore use ICL
to solve for RA, which gives the following reaction function for the bank A:
RseA (xA) = RB +
xA
pL
, (3.1)
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where the superscript se is a mnemonic for an interest rate implementing a separating equi-
librium. This implies that the bank A sets the interest rates just marginally below the cost
the L-type borrower would incur should she accept the rival’s oﬀer.
To obtain the optimal interest rate for bank B, plug (3.1) into ICH . This implies that
ICH has to be slack so that IRH is binding in optimum. Thus, the highest acceptable rate
bank B can oﬀer to customers in the market segment xA ∈ [xA, xA] must be low enough to
compensate them for the cost of visiting bank B:
RseB (xA) = qH −
xA
pH
. (3.2)
Plugging (3.2) into (3.1) gives the equilibrium loan rates in each location xA ∈ [xA, xA]11:
Rse
∗
A (xA) = qH +
xA (pH − pL)
pHpL
,
Rse
∗
B (xA) = qH −
xA
pH
.
The existence of a separating equilibrium depends on whether the banks can feasibly
serve both types of borrowers. The participation constraints PCA and PCB imply that the
separating equilibrium exists in locations xA ∈ [xA, xA], which satisfy Rse
∗
A (xA) ≥ R¯pL and
Rse
∗
B (xA) ≥ R¯pH . Solving for xA from the first inequality, we can obtain the lower bound, xA,
for the locations where the bank A can feasibly charge Rse
∗
A (xA) from the L-type customers:
xA ≥
pHR¯− pLQ
pH − pL
≡ xA. (3.3)
In a similar manner, the bank B can feasibly oﬀer contracts to the H-type borrowers by
charging Rse
∗
B (xA) if xA ≤ xA, where
Q− R¯ ≡ xA. (3.4)
11Note that the IRL condition being slack guarantees that Rse
∗
A (xA) < qL.
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RA
RB
RB*
RA*
PCB
PCA
qH-xA/pH
xA/pL
R/pH
R/pL
Figure 2: xA < xA < xA
In Figure 2 the reaction function Rse
∗
A (xA) intersects the line
R¯
pL
which illustrates bank A’s
participation constraint, at a point above the lowest feasible rate the bank B can oﬀer credit
for H-type borrowers. The equilibrium interest rates can be found at the point of intersection
between the lines Rse
∗
A (xA) and R
se∗
B (xA). This is obviously strictly dominating strategy for
both banks. Figures 3a and 3b, in turn, depict the cases when the cost of visiting banks is
either too low or too high for the separating outcome to be feasible. In Figure 3a the reaction
function Rse
∗
A (xA) intersects the line
R¯
pL
above Rse
∗
B (xA) indicating that the rates R
se∗
B (xA)
feasible for bank B are not high enough to induce bank A set interest rates which would
implement a separating equilibrium. Figure 3b illustrates the situation where the highest rate
for which the H− type borrower is willing accept the oﬀer from bank B is lower than the rate
bank B can feasibly quote. In this case, the separating equilibrium is not feasible as there are
10
no interest rates incentive compatible for each agent in the market.
RA
RB
RB*
RA*
PCB
PCA
R/pH
R/pLxA/pL
qH-xA/pH
Figure 3a: xA < xA
RA
RB
RB*
RA*
PCB
PCA
qH-xA/pH
xA/pL
R/pH
R/pL
Figure 3b: xA > xA
Lemma 1 The necessary conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are
Q > (1 + pH−pL
pH
)R¯ and l >
2(pHR¯−pLQ)
pH−pL ≡ l. (3.5)
If (3.5) holds, there is a separating equilibrium in a market segment xA ∈ [xA,min {xA, l/2}]
with xA >xA > 0.
Proof. Observe that the set [xi, xi] is non-empty if xA >xA, xA < l/2 and xA > 0.
Expressions (3.3) and (3.4) imply that xA >xA if
Q− R¯ > pHR¯− pLQ
pH − pL
⇔
Q >
µ
1 +
pH − pL
pH
¶
R¯.
From (3.3) it also follows that xA < l/2 when
pHR¯− pLQ
pH − pL
<
l
2
.
Finally, xA > 0 holds by assumption Q > R¯. Thus, the necessary preconditions for the
separating equilibrium are those expressed in (3.5). Moreover, we note that xA > 0 because
pHR¯ − pLQ = pH(R¯ − pLqH) > 0 ⇔ qH < R¯/pL which holds by assumption since R¯/pL ≥
Rˆ > qH .
Lemma 1 derives the parameter values under which the separating equilibrium is feasible.
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Provided that (3.5) holds, symmetry of the model implies that there is an identical segment
xB ∈ [xB, xB] in bank B’s captive markets featuring the proposed separating regime. The
intuition of the result is simple. The borrowers are protected by limited liability, which means
that the extent to which higher interest rates reduce the borrowers expected payoﬀ depends
on the success probability of the borrower. Obviously, the L-types - who have lower success
rates but higher returns when successful - accept higher interest rates than the H-types. The
cost of visiting banks, in turn, is fixed for each borrower regardless of their type. The L-types
are therefore less likely to visit bank B than the H-types, and consequently, the non-preferred
bank might be able to serve the H-type clients, insofar as it can internalize the cost. The
eﬃcient separation is feasible in market segments where the cost of visiting the non-preferred
bank is suﬃciently large but not too high. This is because the sorting outcome is incentive
compatible from the L-type’s point of view only if the cost is significant enough. However,
since the H-types must be compensated for the costly visit, the participation constraint of
the non-preferred bank requires that this cost cannot be too large either.
3.2 Adverse selection equilibria
In this section we derive the market segments where some borrowers fail to receive credit,
although their projects are economically viable under full information. Consider first locations
0 ≤ xA <xA, where the banks cannot implement a separating equilibrium. This follows from
the property that the L-type borrowers rather accept the rate Rse
∗
B (xA) than the oﬀer R
se∗
A (xA)
they receive from the bank A. Hence, the H-type borrowers will not participate the market,
because the banks observe that the break even rate in markets where both L-types and H-
types are active equals Rˆ > qH . The banks therefore bid solely for the L-type borrowers. In
such market situations the bank A can employ its local monopoly power and charge a positive
mark-up over the competitive loan rate Rˆ = R¯/pL. Formally, the optimal loan rate for the
bank A is
RasA (xA) =
R¯+ xA
pL
,
where the superscript as stands for adverse selection. The optimal strategy for the preferred
bank A involves an interest rate just slightly below the rate feasible for the rival.
In market segment xA > xA there is no rate that satisfies both the banks’ participation
constraints and H-type borrower’s individual rationality constraint. The threshold xA is
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derived from the participation constraint of the bank B in the following manner. The strategy
profile Rse
∗
B (xA) of bank B is decreasing in the magnitude of the cost xA, because the bank
must internalize this cost to induce H-type borrowers to accept the loan oﬀers. At the limit,
xA = xA, the corresponding rate Rse
∗
B (xA) equals R¯/pH implying that the bank breaks even
at this location. Since Rse
∗
B (xA) is the highest rate H-type borrower accepts at any given
location, there is no rate that satisfies both the banks’ participation constraint and H-type
borrower’s individual rationality constraint in locations xA > xA. In equilibrium, the H-type
borrowers in that market segment will be rationed. For bank A it is optimal to charge the
highest rate which satisfies the constraint IRL. Thus, for xA > xA we have
RasA (xA) = qL. (3.6)
The following proposition summarizes the results concerning the equilibria in the credit
market
Proposition 1 Suppose that (3.5) holds. Then the equilibrium in the credit markets can be
characterized as follows:
i) When xA ∈ [xA,min {xA, l/2}], the equilibrium concept is separating, where L-type
borrowers will be charged according to Rse
∗
A (xA) and the H-type borrowers accept loan contracts
from the bank B with a rate equal to Rse
∗
B (xA).
ii) When xA /∈ [xA,min {xA, l/2}], the equilibrium exhibits adverse selection: Only L-type
borrowers receive finance and will be charged according to RasA (xA) = min{qL, R¯+xApL }.
If condition (3.5) does not hold, the separating regime does not exist. Hence, the H-type
borrowers fail to receive finance and L-type borrowers will be charged RasA (xA) = min{qL, R¯+xApL }.
This result follows immediately from Lemma 1. In market segments where eﬃcient sepa-
ration is feasible, it is optimal for the more distant bank to quote lower rates for the H-type
borrowers, who will accept the oﬀers if the cost of visiting bank B is not too high. The bank
located closer cannot serve these borrowers, because lower rates would induce the L-type bor-
rowers to accept the oﬀers. Therefore, it is optimal for the bank A to set higher rates which
will be declined and accepted on behalf of the H-type and L-type borrowers, respectively. In
locations where separation is not feasible, adverse selection emerges as an equilibrium outcome
and therefore only L-type borrowers will be financed.
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4 Competition, credit rationing and welfare
The distance between the banks located on the two extremes of the line is given by l. The
borrowers are randomly and evenly distributed over this line. Hence, the inverse of l, can be
thought to represent the intensity of competition between the banks.12 To illustrate the role
of bank competition on the outcomes in the credit market in terms of credit rationing and
welfare let Φ (l) measure how large proportion of the markets is covered by the separating
regime. This measure is defined as13
Φ (l) ≡ min {xA, l/2}− xA
l/2
.
The next proposition examines the relationship between this measure and the degree of com-
petition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that (3.5) holds so that l > l. Then the proportion of the market
featuring the separating regime, Φ (l), exhibits the following properties.
i) Φ0 (l) < 0 and Φ00 (l) > 0 for l > 2xA. This implies that higher degree of competition
increases the relative availability of credit.
ii) Φ0 (l) > 0 and Φ00 (l) > 0 for l < 2xA. Hence, higher degree of competition decreases
the relative availability of credit.
If l ≤ l, no separating market segment exists.
Proof. i) When l ∈ (2xA,∞), Φ (l) = 2(xA−xA)/l so that Φ (l) is decreasing and convex
in l. ii) When l ∈ (l, 2xA], Φ (l) = 1− 2xA/l which clearly is increasing and convex in l.
The availability of credit for the H-type borrowers thus evolves non-monotonously along
with a greater degree of competition. When competition is very intense, i.e. l ≤ l defined
in (3.5), adverse selection emerges as an equilibrium outcome in each location in the market
and all borrowers with a high success probability will be rationed. When the banks have
some market power, H-types receive acceptable loan oﬀers from the more distant banks.
Since these oﬀers will be rejected by the L-type borrowers, eﬃcient separation emerges as an
equilibrium in these market segments. This eﬀect, however, will be mitigated as the market
power increases above a certain level, because the more distant bank cannot internalize the
12That is, higher parameter value 1/l corresponds to higher degree of competition.
13 I.e. what is the relative coverage of the separating segment, given by xA−xA, in bank A’s captive markets,
the lenght of which is l/2.
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cost the H-types incur for conducting their business with the less preferred bank. As a result,
the relative number of the H-types who receive credit starts decreasing.
This mechanism can be used to derive the degree of competition, which maximizes the
relative number of loans in the market:
Proposition 3 The availability of credit is maximized at l∗ = 2xA, which is also the welfare
maximizing market structure.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the Proposition 2.
Figure 4 illustrates the unique level for the degree of competition l∗ that maximizes the
availability of credit to the borrowers. The Proposition 3 also states that l∗ is the welfare
maximizing market structure, because the surplus generated by additional transactions is
greater than the social cost from conducting business with a non-preferred supplier of finance.
( )lΦ
l2 Ax 2 Ax
Figure 4
Since the availability of bank credit is often a necessary precondition to firm creation, our
theory suggests that neither perfect competition nor very modest competition is conducive
to firm creation, as the availability of credit would be maximized at an intermediate level
of bank competition. This prediction is in line with the empirical study by Bonaccorsi di
Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004), who find evidence of a ’bell-shaped’ relationship between bank
competition and firm creation. Moreover, this pattern is the most pronounced in informational
opaque industries; i.e. in sectors where the adverse selection problem is the most likely to
arise. Our theory might also oﬀer an ’indirect’ explanation for the observation (e.g. Elsas,
2005) that banks operating in either very competitive or monopolized environments seem to
substitute ’transaction based’ lending for ’relationship based’ finance.
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The analysis in this section may also oﬀer new insight to the discussion about the eﬀects
of competition on the stability of the banking sector. A wide array of research in this issue
was triggered by Keeley (1990), which claimed that the peak in bank failures in the US during
the 1980’s was caused by banking sector deregulation that spurred competition and reduced
monopoly rents. The reason for excessive risk taking was that the reduction in the ’charter
value’ magnified the agency problem between bank owners and government deposit insurance
fund: In the face of lower mark-ups, bank owners had greater incentive to increase upside
potential via excess risk taking because limited liability and deposit insurance deadened the
downside risks.14 The ’charter value’ explanation, however, seems the most relevant in those
cases where a bank — or a group of banks — is close to insolvency; i.e. when the stability of
the financial sector is already seriously threatened. Indeed, Carletti and Hartmann (2003)
conclude in their extensive survey that the claim that bank competition and banks’ risk taking
are generally negatively related is not necessarily robust. In our set up, banks’ risk taking
goes hand in hand with the extent of credit rationing, because it is the low risk borrowers
- if any - who may become rationed. Hence, the higher is the availability of loans in the
credit market the lower is the average default rate in the banks’ loan portfolio. From this it
follows that also the average credit risks (and thereby the systemic risk involved in banking)
are minimized when the degree of competition satisfies the optimal level l∗.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to examine the adverse selection problem in an imperfectly compet-
itive banking system and the relationship between the degree of bank competition and credit
rationing. The analysis shows that eﬃcient separation between borrowers with diﬀerent suc-
cess probabilities may emerge due to the underlying structure of the credit market. This result
is a qualification to the existing research on adverse selection in the credit markets, where the
implementation of a separating equilibrium requires socially wasteful screening practices such
as collateral (Bester 1985, Besanko and Thakor 1987, Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr 1994).
The result is driven by the property that imperfect competition in credit markets can
facilitate sorting in certain market segments: The ’high risk — high yield’ customers rather
accept higher interest rates from the ex-ante preferred bank oﬀers than pay the cost for
14Theoretical results similar to Keeley’s argument were also derived by Besanko and Thakor (1993), Boot
and Greenbaum (1993) and Erwards and Mishkin (1995).
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conducting their business in the less preferred one. The ’low risk — low yield’ borrowers
are more sensitive to interest rates and therefore are more likely to apply credit from the less
preferred bank, provided than it can oﬀer the contract at a suﬃciently low rate. Consequently,
the bank can capture the low risk customers in locations where it can internalize the cost these
borrowers incur for applying credit from the non-preferred bank.
We also show that neither perfect competition nor very modest competition is conducive
to the high availability of credit to new businesses. Under perfect competition, the adverse
selection market failure emerges as an equilibrium and all low risk borrowers are rationed from
credit. Hence, there is a unique level of competition for which the overall availability of credit
is at the highest. This prediction is in line with the empirical study by Bonaccorsi di Patti
and Dell’Ariccia (2004). Our theory might also explain why banks operating in either highly
competitive or monopolized environments seem to substitute ’transaction based’ lending for
’relationship based’ finance (e.g. Elsas, 2005). Finally, we observe that because it is the
low risk borrowers who may become rationed, the level of competition minimizing the credit
rationing might be the market structure which fosters stability in the banking sector.
It is also worth noting that the result concerning the existence of a separating equilibrium
is not limited to credit markets, as it could be generalized to other markets where asymmetric
information about product or service quality generates frictions on the market. It is not
implausible to think that the result applies, for instance, in labor markets where travel costs
constitute a significant factor in labor mobility. In such circumstances the sorting outcome
may emerge between diﬀerent types of workers, because it would be more beneficial for the
skilled workers to move between regions than the unskilled ones, if more distant employers
oﬀer higher wages.
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